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INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFF LAMB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for three counts of theft of lost, 
mislaid, or mistakenly identified property, third degree felonies, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407 (West 2009). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court exceed the limits of reasonability by refusing to 
sever counts because (a) the charges showed a common scheme of rounding 
up stray cattle in a manner that was "quite similar" and making no efforts 
to return them for "an unusually long period of time"; and (b) evidence of 
each count was admissible at separate trials? 
Standard of Review. "The grant or denial of severance is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial judge," which this Court reverses "only if 
the trial judge's refusal to sever charges . . . sacrifices the defendant's right 
to a fundamentally fair trial," thereby "exceedfing] the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, f 10, 198 P.3d 471 
(citations and additional quotation marks omitted). 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that a cattle pasture was an open 
field, unprotected by the Fourth Amendment? 
Standard of Review. When reviewing the denial of a motion to 
suppress, this Court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error 
and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Eari, 2004 UT App 163, f 8, 
92P.3dl67. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407; Utah Code Ann. § 
77-8a-l. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts.1 
In March and April 2010, state inspectors found five lost cattle from 
three separate owners in an open field among Defendant's herd. The cattle 
had all gone missing during cattle drives in or close to 2009. Though 
Defendant knew the lost cattle were not his, he made no effort to return 
them to their rightful owners. When inspectors asked for an explanation, 
Defendant gave inconsistent stories of how he got them and what he 
intended to do with them. 
*** 
Kirby calves 
Tyler Hunter would not have been surprised that some of 
Defendant's cattle had wandered onto his land from a neighboring field. 
Cattle do that. See R229:33. But he found it odd that one of Bud Kirby's red 
baldy calves was with Defendant's herd. R77, 174 (describing calves). It 
seemed too far for the calf to have wandered on its own; it had probably 
1
 The State takes the facts from the suppression hearing, R229, the 
agricultural inspector's affidavit attached to the State's response to 
Defendant's suppression motion, R76-79, the inspector's report attached to 
Defendant's suppression reply, R175-78, and the trial court's findings of 
fact, R200-06. 
been hauled there. R77.2 Since the calf was on Hunter's land, Hunter 
rounded it up and took it back to Kirby. Id. About a week later, some of 
Defendant's cattle again made their way onto Hunter's land. Hunter saw 
another Kirby red baldy calf with Defendant's cattle. Id., 174. This time, he 
reported it to state inspectors. R229:48-49. 
David Carter, a Department of Agriculture theft inspector, and Dell 
Jensen, a State brand inspector, went to have a look. R77; 229:18, 48-49. By 
the time they got to Hunter's, the calf had apparently wandered back onto 
Defendant's field. Using binoculars, Inspector Jensen saw two of Kirby7s 
ownership marks on the calf's ear: an upside-down "T" brand and green 
tag. R175; 229:42-43, 47-48. The calf was close enough to the fence line that 
Jensen could have seen the ear marks with his naked eye from the edge of 
Hunter's land. R48. Inspectors Carter and Jensen went over to the calf on 
Defendant's field and confirmed it belonged to Kirby. R77; 229:49. 
2
 Kirby's land is in Chester, Utah (Rl77) which, according to Google 
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(Rl75). Though not in the record, this Court can take judicial notice of the 
distance between towns in Utah. See Utah Rule of Evidence 201 (allowing 
judicial notice of "a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute," and that 
"can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned."); see also State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339 
(Utah 1955) (taking judicial notice that Panguitch is in Garfield County and 
its location in the county). 
Inspector Carter later spoke with Defendant and asked how two of 
Kirby's calves made it into his herd. Defendant claimed that he only saw 
one of them but "did not know how it got there," and suggested that they 
may have come over from Hunter's property. Id. However, Defendant later 
admitted to hauling them to his pasture the previous fall when he rounded 
up his cattle from grazing land in Wales, Utah that he shared with Kirby. 
R77; 176.3 Defendant claimed that he would have returned the calves to 
Kirby, but it had been "too muddy." R77; 176; 229:30-31. 
McFarland cows 
While looking at the Kirby calf, the inspectors noticed two black, 
bald-faced cows with ear marks and brands different from those Defendant 
used. R77; 229:9-10,19. Inspector Carter asked Defendant how these cows 
made it into his herd. Defendant claimed he had raised them. R77; 175; 
229:28. A few days later, Defendant met with Inspector Jensen and 
admitted that the two cows belonged to Brett McFarland, and that he had 
picked them up during a cattle drive from Wales to Ephraim in Spring 2009. 
K/7,176} z29:16, 27-28. Deienaarit said that he knew McFariand's two cows 
According to Google Maps, Wales is approximately 13 miles from 
Ephraim and 4.5 miles from Chester. 
were with his herd, but had told McFarland more than once that he knew 
nothing about them. R77-78; 175-76; 229:32-33,36-37. 
Andra cow 
About a week after discovering the Kirby calves and McFarland cows 
and impressing on Defendant the importance of reporting stray cows in his 
herd, Inspector Carter found out about yet another lost cow—a corriente — 
in Defendant's herd. R229:37-38.4 It belonged to Brett Andra, who owned a 
pasture and cattle in Wales. R78,177; 229:35. Though it had Andra's brand 
on its ribs, Defendant had put his own ear tag on it. Id. Defendant told 
Inspector Jensen that he had bought it at auction, but just had not had time 
to brand it yet. Rl77. Defendant later told Inspector Carter that he did not 
know where the corriente came from, but had wandered onto his land the 
previous winter. R78; 229:35, 37-38. Defendant said that he was going to 
"cut her out," and that he had only put in the ear tag "in case it got lost 
again [so] somebody would know where to bring it back." R78; 229:35. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
misdelivered property, third degree felonies, for (1) the Kirby red baldy 
4
 "Corriente cattle are a breed of cattle descended from Spanish 
animals brought to the Americas in the late 15th century." See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corriente_cattle (last visited June 4, 2012). 
calves; (2) the McFarland black baldy cows; and (3) the Andra corriente 
cow. Rl-2, 57-58. Defendant filed motions to sever the counts and to 
suppress the discovery of the stolen cattle by the inspectors' search of his 
field. R44-52,128-33. The trial court denied both motions. It ruled that the 
counts were properly joined under Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l as part of a 
common scheme or plan, R200-06 (attached as Addendum B), and that the 
cattle field was an open field and thus undeserving of Fourth Amendment 
protection. R180-87 (attached as Addendum C). Defendant pled guilty as 
charged, on the condition that he could appeal the trial court's suppression 
and severance rulings. See R220, 222-24.5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Severance, Defendant failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's decision, and this Court should reject his claim 
on that basis alone. At any rate, the trial court rightly refused to sever the 
counts in the information because they were all part of a common scheme or 
plan of Defendant to absorb strays into his herd. He would keep them until 
he was found out, at which point he would feign ignorance, ownership, or 
5
 The record shows Defendant entering a "conditional plea," but does 
not reflect what the conditions were. R222. Counsel the State has contacted 
the trial prosecutor, who confirmed that appealing the issues in Defendant's 
brief was the condition of the plea. 
an intent to return them. Though the cows wandered into Defendant's herd 
at different times and belonged to different victims, the crimes were 
contemporaneous where Defendant had all the cows at the same time. 
Defendant cannot show prejudice from joinder because the evidence from 
each count would be admissible at separate trials to show intent and lack of 
mistake or accident. 
Point II: Search of open field. The Fourth Amendment protects 
against unreasonable searches of "persons, houses, papers, and effects/' It 
does not apply to open fields. Whatever "open field" means, the phrase 
surely applies to a field that is out in the open. Defendant's administrative 
search and allegedly erroneous evidentiary arguments are beside the point, 
because no statutory authorization is necessary to search an open field 
under the Fourth Amendment, and no state law limitations on searches 
affect Fourth Amendment analysis. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S THEFTS SHOWED A COMMON PLAN OR 
SCHEME TO STEAL STRAY COWS AND EVIDENCE OF 
EACH COUNT WAS ADMISSIBLE AT SEPARATE TRIALS 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for 
severance because "[t]he charges were not. . . part of a common scheme or 
plan" and that the joinder prejudiced him. Aplt. Br. at 10,14.6 Defendant 
has not marshaled the evidence to the contrary, and this Court should reject 
his claim on that basis. In any event, Defendant's claim fails because 
Defendant had a clear plan or scheme to augment his herd by not returning 
strays to their rightful owners, and Defendant cannot show prejudice 
because evidence of each count would be admissible at separate trials. 
A, This Court should not consider the merits of this claim 
because Defendant failed to marshal the extensive evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding of a common plan or 
scheme. 
Severance of counts under Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (West 2009) 
requires a court to answer two questions: (1) whether the crimes are 
connected or part of a common scheme or plan; and (2) whether a defendant 
is prejudiced by joinder. The prejudice prong requires analysis of whether 
the evidence would be admissible at separate trials under rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, f 21,198 P.3d 471. 
These questions are highly fact-dependent. See id. (setting out factual 
considerations for when severance is appropriate); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 
57, f If 23-29, 993 P.2d 837 (setting out factual considerations underlying 
admission of other acts evidence under rule 404(b)). Thus, before 
6
 Defendant also claims that the charges were not based on the same 
conduct or connected together in their commission. Aplt. Br. at 10. The 
State does not argue, and the trial court did not find, that they were. 
Defendant may challenge the denial of severance or assert that the denial 
unduly prejudiced him, he must first marshal all evidence in the record 
supporting joinder. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see also Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82, If 76,100 P.3d 1117 ("where the legal standard is extremely fact-
sensitive, the appellant has the duty to marshal the evidence"); Hunting v. 
Labor Com'n, 2012 UT App 14, f 1f 15-16, 269 P.3d 998 (holding marshaling 
required when challenged ruling involves mixed question of law and fact). 
Marshaling requires an appellant to "present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings [the appellant] resists." West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord 
Quen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 77. He may not simply provide a selective summary of 
the evidence presented at trial; rather, he must 
temporarily remove [his] own prejudices and fully embrace the 
[State's] position; [he] must play the devil's advocate. In so 
doing [he] must . . . not attempt to construe the evidence in a 
light favorable to [his] case . . . [or] merely re-argue the factual 
case presented to the trial court. 
7 li^^i-rtA TDni'ls f^-ilr-M \A-i-vmn C* r\ v\ Q 4-i s^li 4-<t 1/1 rv A Art-% i€\rv7i tp-v A Arw ifiTnii* TlrxwAe O O f ) * ^ T IT"* ^ R 
f 26, 140 P.3d 1200 (citations and additional quotation marks omitted). 
Because a failure to marshal is "unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable," this 
Court "can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's" ruling. United 
Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, f f 26-27. 
Defendant has made no attempt to marshal the evidence. He merely 
points out the different victims, times, and locations of the thefts — the 
factors supporting his argument.7 He does not acknowledge the many 
similarities that the trial court found, including that the cows "were kept in 
his possession, all of them, for quite a long period of time, in fact, in the 
Court's experience, an unusually long period of time"; the brand inspector 
found all of the cows in Defendant's herd in the same time period; 
Defendant "c[a]me up with two different stories to explain why the cattle 
were there in almost every case"; "the cattle were branded by someone 
else's brand in every case"; and the cows came into Defendant's possession 
in a manner that was "quite similar." R202-03. 
Defendant's brief is a far cry from "presenting], in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings [he] resists." Majestic Investment Co., 818 
P.2d at 1315. Defendant does not "fully embrace the adversary's position," 
nor does he "play the devil's advocate." United Park City Mines Co., 2006 
7
 The trial court noted these differences, but found the similarities 
more compelling. See R200-06, Addendum B. 
UT 35, | 26. Rather, he merely "attempts] to construe the evidence in a 
light favorable to [his] case" and "merely re-argue[s] the factual case 
presented to the trial court." Id. Because Defendant has not marshaled this 
evidence, this Court should reject his claim. Chen, 2004 UT 82, t 80. 
B. Even had Defendant marshaled the evidence, his claim would 
fail 
At any rate, the trial court's ruling was not error because the counts 
showed a common plan or scheme. As stated, joinder of offenses is 
appropriate if the charges are (1) "alleged to have been part of a common 
scheme or plan" and (2) neither party is prejudiced, in that the evidence 
would be admissible at separate trials under rule 404(b). Utah Code Ann. § 
77-8a-l; Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, f 21. 
1. The facts showed a common scheme to blend stolen cattle 
into Defendant's herd and claim mistake if found out 
Crimes need not be identical to be part of a common plan or scheme, 
"so long as the court perceives a visual connection between the two crimes." 
Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, f^ 20 (citations and additional quotation marks 
omitted). Factors for determining whether two crimes are part of a common 
scheme or plan include analysis of the similarity of offenses and victims, 
commonality of location, and closeness in time. See State v. Chambers, 234 
S.W.3d 501, 508-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); see also Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, f 
20 ("This court has interpreted the phrase 'common scheme or plan' to 
apply when the crimes involve a similar fact pattern and proximity in 
time/'). 
The offenses here are identical, and involve similar objects (stray 
cows), found in the same location (Defendant's pasture), at the same time 
(March/April 2010), taken from similar victims (cattlemen). 
Defendant focuses much on the fact that the counts involved separate 
victims, relying heavily on State v. Hildreth, 2010 UT App 209, 238 P.3d 444 
to argue for severance. There, the defendant chiropractor was charged with 
sexually touching three female patients. This Court held that the charges 
against the three separate victims were improperly joined because they 
were too dissimilar in content (different body parts, levels of undress, 
touching) and distant in time (3 years) to have shown a pattern or plan. Id., 
137. 
The number of victims is just one factor in the severance analysis, and 
it is not alone dispositive. Counts involving separate victims —even if they 
are dissimilar —may still be joined for trial. See State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 
168, f 24, 256 P.3d 1102 (holding no abuse of discretion to join counts of 
child and adult sex abuse involving two victims); Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, 
If 27 (holding no abuse of discretion in joinder of counts involving two 
different victims); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding no abuse of discretion in joining counts involving two victims); cf. 
State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (separate victims properly 
joined in murder/child abuse case under single criminal episode statute). 
Severance may be proper if there are too few similarities between the counts 
and the victims and if too much time passes between them. See State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), and State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1979).8 It all depends on the facts. Here, the victims were similar in that 
they were all cattlemen who kept their cattle near Defendant's, at least 
during part of the year. 
The trial court found that the offenses took place after Defendant 
acquired the stray cows, culminating only when he did not make efforts to 
return them within a reasonable time. R204. The offenses thus took place at 
the same time because Defendant had all of the cows at the same time and 
the joinder statute. Gotfrey contains no analysis under rule 404(b), and 
McCumber does not analyze the prior rule (rule 55) except to say that it does 
not apply. Gotfrey also pre-dates evidence rule 404(c), which renders other 
acts of child sex abuse admissible for propensity. Had either or both of 
these factors been considered in Gotfrey, the results likely would be 
different. And one of the counts in McCumber was dissimilar. Here, as 
noted, there were many similarities, and the charges were identical. 
took no steps to return them. The trial court was not specific about the 
precise time at which the offenses went from innocent to criminal 
possession. But because Defendant as appellant bears the burden of 
ensuring an adequate record on appeal to review his claims, any gaps in the 
record are presumed to support the trial court's decision. State v. Tibbits, 
2012 UT App 95,11 2 n.l,275 P.3d 1047. 
But even assuming the offenses occurred on acquisition, time still 
favors joinder. The time between cow acquisitions spanned up to about 
nine months (December 2008 to fall 2009). This is shorter than the eighteen 
months in Gotfrey, 598 P.2d at 1327-28, and the sixteen months in Balfour, 
2008 UT App 410, \ % 30-31, held to support severance. The timespan must 
also be seen in context. First, the reasonability of measures to return lost 
property under the statute necessarily includes a time element: the longer it 
takes to return lost property, the less likely there is a reasonable explanation 
for it. Second, the opportunities to commit the thefts in this case —to sweep 
in and keep cows from distant ranches — only presented themselves during 
cattle drives or round-ups, which take place seasonally. See R229:9 
(explaining that cattle from different owners mingle for the summer on 
common grazing grounds and are divided up in the fall); 202-03 (trial court 
finding that Defendant acquired stray cattle during cattle drives and round-
ups). In this light, the thefts of the cows likely took place in successive 
drives (Winter 2008/09, Spring 2009, or Fall 2009) that would have 
presented the best, and perhaps only, opportunities to take cattle that could 
not just wander in from neighboring ranches. Taking strays from distant 
ranches decreased the likelihood of detection, because non-neighboring 
cattlemen would have fewer, if any, opportunities to observe Defendant's 
cattle than would his neighbors. 
Viewed in totality, the trial court did not "exceed the limits of 
reasonability" by finding a similarity of offenses and victims, a 
commonality of location, and a relative closeness in time, and concluding 
that all three counts were part of a common scheme or plan. See Balfour, 
2008 UT App 410,110. 
2. Defendant has not adequately briefed his prejudice claim 
and this Court should reject it; at any rate, he was not 
prejudiced by joinder because evidence from each count 
would be admissible in separate trials. 
Defendant also claims he was prejudiced by joinder, but does not 
adequately brief this claim. Aplt- Br. at 16-17. Even if Defendant had 
adequately briefed this claim, it would still fail because the evidence was 
admissible at separate trials under rule 404(b). Defendant thus suffered no 
prejudice by joinder. 
An appellate brief must contain "the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). "Implicitly, [this rule] requires not just bald citation to authority 
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). This Court may 
disregard inadequately briefed arguments, as it is not "a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31, 973 P.2d 404 (citation and 
additional quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant's argument of prejudice comprises six sentences with an 
allusion to a single case. He offers only conclusory statements and no 
analysis of rule 404(b). Aplt. Br. at 16-17. That is not adequate briefing, and 
this Court should disregard his argument. 
Even had Defendant adequately briefed his prejudice claim, however, 
it would still fail. Under rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, acts, or 
wrongs is admissible if it is relevant to a proper, non-character purpose and 
is not unfairly prejudicial. See Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, f 22. Each count 
here qualifies. 
Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence," and that "fact is of 
consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401 (2012). Proper 
non-character purposes include, but are not limited to, showing intent, plan, 
knowledge, and lack of mistake or accident. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2); see 
also State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 59, 27 P.3d 1115; Burke, 2011 UT App 168, | 
31; Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, Tf 23; Lee, 831 P.2d at 119. 
Defendant claimed to have the stray cattle by accident and that he 
intended to either return them to their owners or let them go. Evidence that 
Defendant had appropriated multiple cows from different owners was each 
relevant in each instance to show the proper, non-character purposes of 
intent, plan, knowledge, and lack of mistake or accident under the doctrine 
of chances. See, e.g., United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343,1350 (7th Or. 1991) 
(explaining that if you win the lottery once, you get congratulated; if you 
win twice, you get investigated); overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. 
Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Or. 1999); see generally 2 WlGMORE, EVIDENCE § 
302 (3d ed. 1970). Not returning a stray cow for a few days could be 
reasonable decision or an accident; keeping five stray cows for months on 
end is a pattern. 
As to unfair prejudice, "the burden of demonstrating prejudice is a 
difficult one, and the ruling of the trial [court] will rarely be disturbed on 
review. The defendant must show something more than the fact that a 
separate trial might offer him a better chance of acquittal/' Burke, 2011 UT 
App 168, Tf 25 (citation and additional quotation marks omitted). In 
evaluating unfair prejudice, this Court looks to the so-called "Shickks 
factors/' such as the strength of the evidence, similarity of crimes, time 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the availability and efficacy 
of alternative proof, and the chances that the evidence will "'rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility/" Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, | 25 (quoting State 
v. Shickks, 760 R2d 291,295-96 (Utah 1988)). 
A review of the Shickks factors in this case shows that there is no 
unfair prejudice in the admission of the evidence. In the event of a trial, the 
agriculture inspector, brand inspector, and rightful cattle owners would 
testify and be subject to cross examination, which is a strong form of 
evidence. See Burke, 2011 UT App 168, f 35 (holding in-person testimony 
'''relatively strong" evidence for purposes of 404(b)). The crimes were 
identical, and in the contexts of the charge and of cattle ranching, were 
committed fairly close in time. The State also had a great need for the 
evidence, as the trial court found that "[without [it], it would be difficult 
for the State to disprove [Defendant's] claim that it was an accident or 
mistake that the cattle were in [Defendant's] herd." R205.9 Moreover, 
"[t]here [was] little the State could provide in terms of alternative proof." 
Id. Absent an admission—and especially in light of repeated denials — 
intent must be shown by "defendant's conduct and surrounding 
circumstances." Lee, 831 P.2d at 119 (citation and additional quotation 
marks omitted). And there was no danger that the jury would be roused to 
"overmastering hostility" by evidence of one cattle theft more than another. 
See Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, \26 (holding that "evidence of multiple acts 
of similar or identical [criminal conduct] is unlikely to prejudice a jury") 
(citation omitted). 
In sum, because the evidence from each count showed a common 
scheme or plan and would have been admissible at separate trials, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to sever. 
9
 The trial court has also admitted 404(b) evidence of an uncharged 
stray cow theft. R193-99. Defendant has not appealed this ruling. 
II. 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPRESSION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE A 
CATTLE FIELD IS AN OPEN FIELD AND NOT 
PROTECTED UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT10 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress because (1) the brand inspector statute, Utah Code Ann. § 4-24-28, 
violates the Fourth Amendment restrictions on administrative searches; and 
(2) the trial court made a clearly erroneous finding of fact by believing 
Inspector Carter's testimony that he saw the Kirby calf's ear tag and brand 
using binoculars while on a neighbor's property. Aplt. Br. at 17, 20. These 
arguments have no merit. The State, however, does not address them 
directly because they are beside the point. Regardless of the statutory 
authority for an administrative search, and notwithstanding any dispute on 
exactly where Inspector Carter was standing when he saw the calf belonged 
to Kirby, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the open field where the 
stolen cows were found. 
The Fourth Amendment protects "persons, houses, papers, and 
effects" from unreasonable searches and seizures. It does not protect "open 
fields." Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Because Defendant's 
cattle pasture is an open field, the Fourth Amendment thus does not apply 
10
 The State combines in this section its responses to the second and 
third sections of Defendant's brief. 
to it. See State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1984) (holding defendant's 
land visible from neighbor's yard an open field); see also United States v. 
Caldwell, 238 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding fenced cattle pasture 30 to 60 
yards from house an open field); Braden v. Lake, 25 Fed. Appx. 513, 524 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (holding property surrounded by barbed wire fence "to keep out 
trespassers or control cattle" an open field); Schroeder v. Kochanowski, 311 
F.Supp.2d 1241 (D. Kan. 2004) (ruling cattle pasture an open field); State v. 
Dahlin, 2011 WL 6916536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (holding twice-fenced land 
for holding cattle an open field); State v. Tinsley, 823 P.2d 205 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding land by barn and cattle shed 70 feet from home an open 
field); Westfall v. State, 10 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (holding fenced 
cattle field and barn an open field).11 
The fact that the inspectors may have trespassed or not asked for 
permission to enter does not change affect this conclusion. See United States 
v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 953 (2012) ("Quite simply, an open field, unlike the 
11
 An "open field" need not even be open or a field. It can be a 
secluded field surrounded bv woods, fences, chicken wire, or 
embankments, and entirely out of public view or access, see Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170,174,180 (1984); it can be land near a home, see Hester 265 
U.S. at 58-59; it can be a cave, a still, a shed, a small concrete building, a 
chicken coop, a hog pen, a goose pen, see United States ex ret. Saiken v. 
Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292,1296 (7th Cir. 1976); a parking lot, State v. Atwood, 
831 P.2d 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); or a concrete slab patio, cf. State v. 
Perkins, 2009 UT App 390,222 P.3d 1198. 
curtilage of a home, . . . is not one of those protected areas enumerated in 
the Fourth Amendment. . . . . The Government's physical intrusion on such 
an area —unlike its intrusion on the 'effect' at issue here —is of no Fourth 
Amendment significance."); Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179, 
181,182 n.13,183-84; see also Casey v. State, 488 P.2d 546 (Nev. 1971) (citing 
cases showing open fields remained unprotected under the Fourth 
Amendment, even though fenced or posted with "no trespassing" signs, 
and regardless of plain view). 
Defendant's reliance on New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) is 
misplaced. There, the court upheld an administrative search of a junkyard. 
It explained that the state statute authorizing the search complied with the 
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement because "closely 
regulated" businesses enjoyed a lesser expectation of privacy, the state had 
a substantial interest in preventing theft, and the authorizing statute limited 
the discretion of officers to search. Id. at 702, 708, 717. But the important 
distinction is that the Fourth Amendment applied to businesses in the first 
place. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543, 546 (1967). It does not 
apply to open fields. 
Nor does the existence of a state statute change the result. The 
authorization that Utah Code Ann. § 4-24-28 gives to search an open field is 
superfluous for constitutional purposes, though it may protect state agents 
from civil suits. And any restriction it imposes on such searches is 
irrelevant because "state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's 
protections." Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,176 (2007). 
Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to open fields, and 
any trespass on such an area is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property. 
A person commits theft when: 
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered 
under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property, without taking 
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the property when he obtains the property or at any time prior 
to taking the measures designated in paragraph (1). 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76 06 040700.ZIP 1,734 Bytes 
« Previous Section (76-6-406) Next Section (76-6-408) » 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page [ Terms of Use/Privacy Policy | ADA Notice 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate 
Title/Chapter/Section: sSSSM' Search Code by Key Word 
« Previous Section (77-8-4) Next Section (77-9-1)» 
Utah 
Code 
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Criminal Offense Charges Chapter 
Section 
1 
Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants, 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same indictment or information if 
each offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are: 
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(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing 
with respect to both the misdemeanor and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have 
participated in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need 
not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the 
court in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if the 
offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or 
information. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in 
an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of 
separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least five 
days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose 
any statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFF LAMB, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
Case No.: 101600091 
Judge: WALLACE A LEE 
On January 28; 2011, Defendant filed a Motion to Sever Charges. The Court conducted a 
hearing on Defendant's Motion on March 9th, 2011. The Court now enters its following Findings 
and Order: 
1. The Court acknowledges that Mr. Lamb is presumed innocent at the time the 
Court considered Mr. Lamb's Motion to Sever. The Court has not heard all the 
evidence and enters this Finding and Order based on the information and 
recogmzes that all the Court has at this point is the State's allegations and things 
the parties have argued about before the Court. 
* • 
2. The Court began its analysis by examing Utah Code Annotated section 77-8'a-l, 
dealing with Joinder of Offenses and Defendants. The statute provides that two 
or more felonies, such as in the case, may be charged in the same Information if 
each is a different count and if the offenses are either based on conduct that is 
connected together or alleged to be part of a common scheme or plan. 
3. The Court went through an analysis to determine whether it found whether the 
State or Mr. Lamb would be prejudiced by joinder. 
4. • The Court considered whether the offenses were connected together in their 
commission. The Court relied on Hildreth (238 P.3d 4445 Utah App. 2010) in 
making its determination. Based on Hildreth the Court found that when there is a 
direct relationship between them because the conduct resulting in one charge was 
precipitated by conduct resulting in another charge. 
5. In this case, the Court did not find that the crimes charged in this case were 
connected together by one of the charges being precipitated by commission of 
other charges. The Court did not find a direct relationship between any of the 
charges. The Court did not find that the charges were based on the same conduct 
or otherwise connected together in their commission. 
6. Second, the Court also looked to Hildreth and considered in this case whether the 
charges were part of "a common scheme or plan'1. Based on Hildreth, the Court 
indicated that there does not have to be perpetrated in absolutely identical manner 
as long as there is a visual connection between the two or more crimes. 
7. The Court also realized it had to look at similarities between different counts. 
The Court considered the facts, the timing of the incidents in. their totality. Have 
to look at factual similarities viewed in light of their temporal proximity to one 
another. 
8. The Court realizes there were differences between the different Counts such as 
different owners, different kinds of livestock, different days when the animals 
came to be in Mr. Lamb's possession according to the allegations; finally, the 
livestock were taken from different locations. 
9. The Court also finds there are a lot of similarities. The Court finds that the cattle 
ended up in Mr. Lamb's possession in quite similar ways each time, either 
because they became part of his herd as he was driving them from summer range 
to winter areas, or that they were hauled down from the summer range to the 
winter range. They were picked up in similar ways. 
10. There were different dates when the cattle allegedly came into Mr. Lamb's 
possession, but they were kept in his possession, all of them, for quite a long 
period of time, in fact, in the Court's experience, an unusually long period of 
time. The Court also finds it similar in that the cattle were all there when thev 
were discovered by the Brand Inspector. 
11. The Court also finds similar that Mr. Lamb apparently come up with two 
different stories to explain why the cattle were there in almost every case. The 
Court also finds that the cattle were branded by someone else's brand in every 
case. So there are similarities. 
All in all, when the Court considers how the cattle came into Mr. Lamb's 
possession, the Court finds that each occurrence was quite similar in each case -
how he came into contact with the cattle and how he kept them in his possession. 
The Court finds each occurrence similar. 
The Court also considered the timing of the alleged events. The Court 
considered Mr. Lamb's argument that the alleged crimes were committed when 
he acquired the animals, or alternatively, as the State argues, that the alleged 
crimes were committed when the cattle were discovered in Kir. Lamb's 
possession. To make this determination the Court referenced Utah Code 
Annotated, section 76-6-407, wrhich here defines the crime. 
The Court interprets the statute to mean that the crime is committed when a 
person obtains the property of another person that he knows to have been lost or 
mislaid and does not take reasonable measures to return the cattle, or the 
property, to the rightful owner. Additionally, the Court interpreted the statute to 
he obtained the property or at any time prior to taking the measures of returning 
the properties to their owners. 
15. It seems to the Court that there is a continuum here, that is, the person can have 
the purpose to deprive either when he first came into possession of the property 
or at any time before he returned the property to the owners. 
16. Here, the Court finds that the alleged crime wras not committed when Mr. Lamb 
first obtained the cattle. Instead, the Court finds based on Mr. Lamb having had 
the cattle in his possession for in some cases over a year - all of the cattle for 
several months, without talcing reasonable measures to return them to their 
owner, which he obviously knew were not his - that the crime was committed in 
this case when Mr. Lamb retained the cattle for an unreasonable amount of time 
without taking reasonable measures to return the cattle to their owners. 
17. Ultimately, the Court finds that the charges are sufficiently similar to conclude 
that there was a common plan or scheme. 
18. Next, the Court conducted an analysis to determine whether there was prejudice 
to Mr. Lamb if the Court allowed the crimes to be charged in the same 
Information. Again, the Court looked to Hildreth, which directed the Court to 
conduct a 404(b) analysis. 
19. In Mr. Lamb's case, the Court considered whether the evidence of the different 
charges is offered for a non-character purpose. The Court finds that the evidence 
is offered to prove what Mr. Lamb's intent was in having the cattle in his herd. 
The evidence is also offered to prove that he had knowledge that the cattle in his 
herd were not his animals. Additionally, the evidence is offered to prove absence 
of mistake or accident on Mr. Lamb's part. It seems plausible to the Court that 
Mr. Lamb could testify that he didn't know the cattle were in his herd, that they 
wandered into his herd and that it was a simple mistake, but the evidence of the 
other crimes could be used to establish lack of mistake or accident. Therefore, 
the Court finds that the evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose. 
The Court also finds that the evidence of the other crimes is relevant, as it does 
tend to make the existence of any factors of consequence more or less probable. 
The Court looked at the "Shickles" factors to determine whether there is unfair 
prejudice to Mr. Lamb. The Court found that the strength of the evidence in each 
count is fairly strong, the strongest being the count involving the two, black, bald 
faced cows because of the alleged testimony Mr. McFarlane that he asked Mr. 
Lamb three times if he had seen the cows and each time Mr. Lamb denied seeing 
them. However, the evidence in each count is fairly strong. 
The Court finds the evidence that while the cattle were allegedly brought into Mr. 
Lamb's herd at different times, they were discovered at or near the same time. 
The Court finds that the State has a great need for the evidence. Without the 
evidence, it would be difficult for the State to disprove the claim that it was an 
accident or mistake that the cattle were in Mr. Lamb's herd. There is little the 
State could provide in terms of alternative proof. 
The Court asserts that joinder would not arouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility to consider the counts together. In other words, if the Court were to 
sever the counts, the Court would likely allow the State to submit 404(b) 
evidence anyway. 
24. Therefore, after examining the totality of the case, the Court finds that the counts 
alleged by the State can be charged in the same Information and can be tried 
together. 
25. Thus, Mr. Lamb's Motion to Sever is DENIED. / \ fj \ SfSvS ~ °P o\ 
DATED Z\ S c p W U ^ 2011. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFF LAMB, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 101600091 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress. The motion has been fully briefed. The Court 
heard evidence on the motion in a hearing on 27 July 2011. In addition, the Court heard oral 
argument from counsel concerning the motion on 7 September 2011. This motion is now ready 
for decision. 
DECISION 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
ANALYSIS 
At ine evidentiary neanng on 2/ July 2011, in response to questioning on cross 
examination, David H. Carter, state.livestock theft investigator, testified he and brand inspector, 
Dell R. Jensen, received peraiission from Tyler Hunter to go onto his field which adjoins a field 
owned by Defendant. Their purpose was to investigate an alleged theft of livestock by 
Defendant. 
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Using binoculars, while standing in Tyler Hunter's field, Carter testified he and Jensen 
were able to see the cattle they suspected were stolen in Defendant's adjoining field. They 
determined the cattle were stolen by viewing their ear tags through the binoculars. Carter 
testified he could see from his vantage point on Hunter's property that two calves on 
Defendant's property belonged to another cattle owner, Mr. Kirby. With this information, Carter 
testified he and Jensen then entered Defendant's field through an unlocked gate to verify what 
they had seen with the binoculars.1 
Defendant argues when Carter and Jensen entered Defendant's field without first 
notifying him of their intentions and without his consent, they violated Utah Code Annotated 
Section 4-24-28(2) and Defendant's fourth amendment rights against unlawful search and 
seizure.2 The State counters that Carter and Jensen were lawfully on property from which they 
were able to view the allegedly stolen cattle, and in any event, under the open fields doctrine, 
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field. Finally, the State claims 
Section 4-24-28(2) specifically authorizes entry into any premises where livestock are kept or 
]The Court does not have a transcript of the suppression hearing on 27 July 2011. These 
background facts are taken from personal notes written by the Court during the hearing. The 
Court is confident these notes accurately report the applicable testimony. 
^Initially Defendant also sought to suppress various statements he made claiming those 
statements were obtained by the brand inspectors in violation of Defendant's Miranda rights. 
However, at the suppression hearing on 27 July 2011, Defendant withdrew that claim. 
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maintained for the purpose of examining brands or marks, and brand inspectors are only required 
to obtain a search warrant if admittance to the property is refused. 
In any Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis, the first question the Court must 
consider is whether there was a search. The Court concludes there was not a search in this case 
proscribed by the Fourth Amendment because even though there was clearly governmental 
action, the Court finds the acts of the brand inspectors occurred in an open field where 
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176. 
Therefore, as noted by the United States Supreme Court in Oliver, "government's intrusion 
upon the open fields is not one of those "unreasonable searches" proscribed by the text of the 
Fourth Amendment." Id. 
Nevertheless, Defendant argues Utah Code Annotated Section 4-24-28(2) supercedes and 
nullifies the open fields doctrine in Utah, because it requires officers to contact the owner of a 
field and ask permission to enter the field before doing so. 
The Court disagrees. When interpreting a statute, the Court is required to (1) look first to 
the statute's plain language with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent; 
(2) presume the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning; and (3) read the statute as a whole and interpret the provisions in 
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harmony with related provisions and statutes. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 164 P.3d 384, 396 (Utah 2007). 
In this case, the plain language of Section 4-24-28(2) simply does not require 
enforcement officers to seek consent of the owner of a field where livestock is kept before entry. 
In this way, at least with respect to fields, the statute mirrors the open fields doctrine. 
Though the Court understands and appreciates the logic of Defendant's argument, the 
Court is not willing to extrapolate a consent or notice requirement to be added to the first 
sentence of Section 4-24-28(2), by implication from the language of the second sentence of the 
section which requires a warrant if entry is refused. Likewise, the Court is not willing to nullify 
the application of the open fields doctrine simply because of the enabling language of Section 4-
24-28(2) relating to brand inspectors. 
Indeed, similar to the Fourth Amendment, Article I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution 
clearly affords constitutional protection only to "persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." Defendant does not cite any Utah decision which extends 
Utah Constitutional protection to open fields. 
The Court has carefully reviewed New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), cited by 
Defendant, and concludes it does not apply to the facts of this case. The Court in Burger was 
considering a very different situation. The property at issue in that case was commercial 
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property in which the Court acknowledged the owner had a reasonable, though somewhat 
reduced, expectation of privacy. Therefore, the action of the officers in that case constituted a 
warrantless search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment unless there was a valid and recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement. The State of New York claimed the administrative 
inspection exception applied and that exception was carefully analyzed by the Supreme Court. 
This case is very different. The activity of the brand mspectors in this case took place in 
an open field, a place in which Defendant clearly has no reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Therefore, no warrant was required, and the Court need not consider any exception to the 
warrant requirement. On this basis, the Court is not required to consider the facial 
constitutionality of Section 4-28-28(2), and as applied in this case, it conforms with the open 
fields doctrine in all material respects.3 
Finally, even if the Court were to consider the open fields doctrine inapplicable in Utah 
for brand inspectors because of Section 4-24-28(2), the Court agrees with the State that there is 
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement for evidence which is found in an officer's 
3The analysis would obviously be different if the brand inspectors had entered a bam or 
other commercial building to conduct an agricultural inspection and suspected stolen livestock 
there. Then there would be heightened concern about the constitutionality of the statute and the 
Burger analysis suggested by Defendant would apply. 
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plain view. In this case that exception appears to apply at least to the officers' observation of the 
allegedly stolen cattle from the Hunter property. 
For the plain view exception to apply, the Court must find:" (1) the officer is lawfully 
present; (2) the evidence is in plain view; and (3) the evidence is clearly incriminating." State v. 
Humphrey, 138 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah Ann. 2006). See also, State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 48 (Utah 
1981). • . * 
In this case, Carter testified that before entering Defendant's field, he had •permission 
from Tyler Hunter, the owner of a field which directly adjoined Defendant's field, to enter the 
neighboring field to observe cattle on Defendant's property. From that lawful vantage point, 
using binoculars, Carter and Jensen were able to see the two calves they suspected were stolen, 
in plain view, in Defendant's open field. Finally, Carter testified that from his lawful position, 
he was able to tell the calves did not belong to Defendant by observing their ear tags. Thus, the 
evidence in this case was clearly incriminating. 
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he constitutional interests protected by the 
prohibition against unlawful searches do not require the police to be less observant than the 
average person. Nor must a police officer avert his gaze from contraband because a criminal 
wishes to avoid detection. A desire to avoid detection of criminal activity does not ipso facto 
give rise to a protectable privacy interest." Id. 
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The actions of Carter and Jensen in this case did not violate Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. The evidence they gathered may be used at trial. Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress is DENIED. 
DATED this 9 September 2011. 
Wallace A. Lee 
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